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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF 
SALT LAKE CITY, a public 
entity, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. Case No. 870236 
JUANITA IRENE BURGE, ROBERT 
D. BARROWS, JR; BEATRICE 
IRENE BARROWS; et. al. 
Defendants/Appellants 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A reading of plaintiff's Statement of Facts in its Brief 
of Respondents (RDA) would cause one to conclude that the 
plaintiff was an uninterested bystander in bringing about the 
redevelopment of Block 57. It would have us believe that any 
problems with the acquisition of the subject property or 
other parcels on the block would be of concern only to 
Lincoln or the neighboring owners, but not to the plaintiff. 
Its summary1 of the Order conveys the impression it was 
nothing more than a typical Order of Immediate Occupancy 
pursuant to § 78-34-9 Utah Code Ann. By not mentioning the 
1
 Brief of Respondents, pp. 6-7. 
1 
fact that it obtained an option from the owners to purchase 
the subject property and agreed to pay interest accruing 
before possession was transferred one would be lead to 
conclude that these must be unimportant provisions of the 
Order. The fact is that the plaintiff as the Redevelopment 
Agency of Salt Lake City was charged with the responsibility 
for the successful redevelopment of Block 57. It had chosen 
Lincoln to be its developer from among others who were 
interested and it had agreed with Lincoln to use its powers 
of eminent domain if necessary to expedite the project. But 
the decision of Judge Uno had cast a cloud upon its power of 
eminent domain to acquire any of Block 57 because of 
procedural defects on the part of plaintiff affecting the 
whole project. 
Plaintiff was under increasing pressure to at least 
begin development of the north one-third of the block, but 
Lincoln was losing interest and the plaintiff was anxious to 
immediately execute with Lincoln an ADL agreement by which 
Lincoln would commit to the project and begin immediate 
redevelopment. Lincoln would not sign unless it was assured 
that the plaintiff had the right to acquire the necessary 
property. Plaintiff, therefore, filed its condemnation 
action against the subject property which was the only 
remaining parcel not yet secured in the north one-third of 
2 
the block. But plaintiff's subsequent Motion for an Order of 
Immediate Occupancy was contested by the owners. 
Because it was imperative that the ADL be signed without 
delay plaintiff sought a 60 day option from the owners to 
establish plaintiff's right to purchase the property. It was 
anticipated 60 days would be required to complete the signing 
of the ADL and to pay the owners $76,450.00 of the purchase 
price.2 As consideration for the option the first draft of 
the contract set forth plaintiff's promise to pay interest to 
accrue from the date of the option3 for up to three years. 
This was payable on the condition that within thirty days the 
owners gave the plaintiff possession, otherwise the Order 
would be void.4 This deadline for the early transfer of 
possession was not acceptable to the owners who wanted to 
hold the property during the period in which interest was 
accruing. As a result the final draft of the Order left 
paragraph 1(a) unchanged in requiring interest to accrue from 
the date of the option, but any deadline or time frame by 
2
 The neighbors agreed to contribute $76,450.00 to 
the owners if the ADL were signed. Since the ADL 
was not signed those provisions in the contract are 
not discussed herein. 
3
 The option became effective upon execution of the 
Order by the parties, its entry with the court, and 
deposit with the clerk of $275,220.00. 
4
 Paragraph 1(b) of the draft of the Order attached 
to Brief of Appellants as Exhibit "B". 
3 
which time possession had to be transferred was removed from 
paragraph 1(b) along with removal of the provision that the 
contract would be void if possession were not transferred. 
The time for transfer of possession was no longer a condition 
which could render the contract void. The time for the 
accruing of interest remained unrelated to when plaintiff 
would take possession as provided in both drafts. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff's purpose for entering into the contract was 
to remove any bar to the signing of the ADL and to open the 
way for its signing by removing any cloud upon plaintiff's 
right or power to acquire the property. It was not necessary 
that the plaintiff obtain actual possession of the property. 
It was only necessary that it establish it had the right to 
take possession and obtain title. The bar to the signing was 
removed when plaintiff received the owners' promise to give 
possession, thereby opening the way for the signing of the 
ADL and commencement of redevelopment activities. Since 
plaintiff was directly responsible for the redevelopment 
success of the block it was directly benefited by the option 
which opened the way for the signing of the ADL. Plaintiff 
must pay for this benefit. 
Also, the statute construed in the Dade County case5 
5
 Dade County v. Briaham. 47 So.2d 602 (Fla. 1950). 
4 
resembles more nearly § 11-19-23.9, Utah Code Ann., 1953, 
than the statutes construed in any of the other cases cited 
by the parties and is precedence for allowing an award for 
expert witness fees incurred by the owners. The intent and 
purpose of the statute is to more fully compensate the owner 
beyond simple "just compensation", and "costs" should be 
given a broader meaning than mere taxable "court costs". 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF RECEIVED THE BENEFIT OF THE 
ORDER OF IMMEDIATE OCCUPANCY AND HAS AN 
OBLIGATION TO PAY INTEREST AS PROMISED 
As a preliminary matter the Brief of Appellants did not 
set forth as alleged by plaintiff an offer to offset interest 
agreed to by crediting plaintiff with the rental income 
received by the owners.6 Plaintiff's quote from page 37 of 
the Brief of Appellants stated that offsetting the interest 
payments due would only be proper in the event this court 
determined that possession was a condition precedent to the 
payment of interest. This was stated in the sentence 
following that quoted by plaintiff. The owners deny, 
however, that the transfer of possession to the plaintiff was 
such a condition for the plaintiff's payment of interest. 
Plaintiff's refusal to pay interest is based upon the 
6
 Brief of Respondents, page 10. 
5 
following assertions: (1) It did not obtain possession of 
the prop€*rty due to a withdrawal by the owners of the funds 
on deposit, but instead was required to prove at trial it's 
right of eminent domain in order to obtain possession. (2) 
Obtaining possession under paragraph 1(b) of the Order was 
the only consideration provided by the Order for its payment 
of interest and it did not obtain possession. (3) It 
received no benefit under the Order, and (4) the Order is 
void, therefore no interest is owing. In addition to a 
discussion of these matters in the owners' Brief of 
Appellants the owners reply as follows: 
1. Plaintiff's right and power of condemnation was not 
an issue at trial. The plaintiff did not have the right to 
take the property even though the owners were not parties to 
Judge Uno's decision that was adverse to the owners. His 
decision placed a cloud upon the right of the plaintiff to 
condemn any of the properties on Block 57 due to procedural 
irregularities common to the whole block. But at trial this 
precedent was not argued by the owners. Plaintiff merely 
offered into evidence copies of it's resolutions and 
proceedings to which no objection was made nor was argument 
offered against plaintiff's right of eminent domain. Any 
statement by plaintiff to the contrary7 is not supported by 
7
 Brief of Respondents, page 9. 
6 
the record. Nor does plaintiff deny that prior to trial an 
agreement to the contrary was reached between Mr. Oswald and 
Mr. Evans8 in which the owners agreed to waive their defense 
denying plaintiff's right of eminent domain, in order to 
avoid plaintiff's abandonment of these proceedings as a 
result of Judge Uno's ruling. 
2. Possession was not consideration for payment of 
interest. Plaintiff says possession was consideration for 
interest payments because, (a) paragraph 1(b) of the original 
draft of the Order says so and the only reason for its 
revision was to make its provision "self-executory"9, and (b) 
it would be incongruous for the owners to receive interest 
during the same period it is collecting rent. 
(a) Revision of draft of Order. Plaintiff argues that 
since the original draft of paragraph 1(b) of the Order 
required the transfer of possession for interest to be 
payable this must be the meaning of the final draft also 
since the only purpose for the change was to make its 
provision "self-executory" by eliminating a need to file a 
motion to have the Order vacated. Eliminating the need to 
file a motion was not the purpose of the change. A motion to 
vacate was simply no longer needed because the Order would no 
8
 Brief of Appellants, page 36. 
9
 Brief of Respondents, page 8. 
7 
longer be "null and void" as it could have under the 
provisions of the first draft. 
The main thrust of the revision went to remove the 
deadline in the draft by which time the owners were required 
to withdraw at least part of the funds. Under the first 
draft if the owners did not transfer possession within thirty 
days they lost their opportunity to be paid the interest 
(unless the ADL was signed). The final Order removed that 
deadline so the owners could now withdraw the funds "as 
herein provided". No deadline was provided. It would bring 
about an incongruous result to remove from the Order a time 
limit for the withdrawal of funds and then penalize the 
owners through a finding that they had failed to withdraw 
funds in a timely manner causing them to lose the accrued 
interest. Plaintiff's argument that the Order is "void" 
should not be upheld when the language of the draft was 
removed that stated that the Order would become "null and 
void" if possession were given. 
(b) Payment to the owners of both rent and interest is 
consistent with the provisions of the Order. As a 
preliminary matter it should be noted that there is no 
evidence as to the amount of rent collected by the owners 
during the twenty-two months this action was pending contrary 
8 
to plaintiff's allegations.10 At the time of the entry of 
the final Order of Condemnation most of the tenants were in 
default in their payments and rents remain in arrearage to 
this date. As the time approached for the tenants to face 
eviction they seemed to lose incentive to remain current on 
their rents. 
Receipt by the owners of both interest and rent for the 
same period is consistent with the Order because the date 
interest begins accruing is different from the date of 
transfer of possession. Paragraph 1(a) provides for interest 
to accrue from the date of deposit of the funds, which also 
is the effective date of the owners option to sell. As noted 
above there is no time frame for the transfer of possession. 
Even under the original draft of the Order requiring the 
owners to withdraw funds within thirty days of their deposit, 
interest was still accruing during that thirty day period 
before possession had to be transferred. During that time 
the owners could still be collecting rents. Had interest 
been consideration for the transfer of possession there would 
had been no reason to even require the deposit of funds with 
the clerk until the time for the transfer to take place. 
By way of clarification plaintiff stated that the 
Brief of Respondents, page 9. 
9 
landowners are claiming interest for twenty-two months.11 In 
fact the landowners are claiming the right to receive 
interest during the full thirty-six months provided for in 
paragraph 1(a) of the Order. During the fourteen months 
following payment in full of the funds on deposit as ordered 
by the trial court interest should be paid at 11.5 percent 
less the highest interest rate available for federally 
insured ciccounts, which rate should be determined by the 
trial court upon remand. The plaintiff is obligated to make 
up the "shortfall or difference between the actual interest 
earned by virtue of the clerk's investment (at the highest 
interest rate available for federally insured accounts) and 
the 11.5 annual percentage rate...."12 It does not matter 
whether the funds are invested by the clerk or by the owners 
who received the funds pursuant to a court Ordered 
distribution. The plaintiff is still obligated to pay that 
difference. 
3. Plaintiff was benefited by the owners' option. 
Plaintiff argues that it "did not receive any of the rights 
and privileges of the Order and, conversely, it is not 
obligated for any of the duties imposed by said Order because 
1 1
 Brief of Respondents, page 9. 
1 2
 Order of Immediate Occupancy, paragraph 1(a), pp 3-
4. 
10 
the same never took effect."13 Statements throughout 
plaintiff's brief seek to convey the impression that 
possession was to be the only consideration for the payment 
of interest and since it received no possession under the 
Order it owes no interest.14 Plaintiff would have this court 
treat the contract as a simple Order of Immediate Occupancy 
pursuant to § 78-34-9 Utah Code Ann., 1953, under which 
possession triggers the running of interest payments, and 
that without possession there is nothing that is binding or 
that places any duty upon the plaintiff. 
What the plaintiff totally fails to address in its Brief 
is that possession was not what the Order was all about. 
Possession never became important to the plaintiff. The 
reason plaintiff sought the Order was because it needed to 
clear the way for the signing of the ADL agreement so that 
Lincoln would begin redevelopment of the Block.15 The ruling 
13
 Brief of Respondents, page 7. 
14
 Plaintiff states that the Order contains "terms and 
provisions upon which possession pendente lite of 
the subject property would be given to the RDA." 
(Brief of Respondents, page 2). It's Statement of 
Issues states that the question for review is 
whether interest should be given "as a condition 
for immediate occupancy." (Brief of Respondents, 
page 1). 
1 5
 "Lincoln expressed interest in commencing the 
undertaking only if they could be assured of 
acquiring the entire north one-third of Block 
57.... It was in this condition that the landowners 
11 
of Judge Uno together with the owners' objection to 
plaintiff's Motion for an Order of Immediate Occupancy cast a 
cloud on plaintiff's power to exercise a right of eminent 
domain to acquire Block 57.16 
Actual possession was not required or necessary for the 
signing of the ADL. Lincoln was not going to begin immediate 
construction. It only required that the plaintiff establish 
that it had the right to possession. That right was granted 
by the owners to the plaintiff in the form of an option as 
provided in paragraph 1(b) of the Order. The option took 
effect upon the signing and entry of the Order by the court. 
Receipt of that option right was the real benefit plaintiff 
received for the promise to pay interest as further discussed 
herein were approached and became, for all 
practical purposes, the last holdouts in that 
Block. The RDA filed a Condemnation Action in an 
effort to acquire the property and to insure that 
Lincoln would have the requisite ground necessary 
to undertake the initial development of the Block. 
"It was necessary that the RDA obtain at least a 
preliminary indication from the court of its right 
to acquire the property and, therefore, the agency 
sought an Order of Immediate Occupancy." Brief of 
Respondents, pp. 4-5. (Emphasis added) 
"The effect of Judge Uno's decision was to create 
serious impediment to Lincoln properties ability to 
develop the Block and create a considerable 
negotiation leverage in landowners who may be 
dealing with Lincoln property." Brief of 
Respondents, page 4. 
12 
in the Brief of Appellants.17 That possession was not even 
important to plaintiff is evident from the fact that nowhere 
in the contract did the plaintiff require the owners to give 
up possession if the ADL were not signed. It was never 
contemplated that the plaintiff should be able to accept the 
benefit of the owners' promise to not stand in the way of the 
signing of a ADL without the plaintiff paying for that 
benefit, and that payment was to be in the form of interest 
on the deposited funds accruing from date of the option. 
The Order was not a unilateral contract in which the 
plaintiff made promises to pay interest that were enforceable 
only if the owners elected to give possession. The plaintiff 
promised to pay interest and in return the owners promised to 
convey free and clear of their defenses against the 
plaintiff's right of condemnation. This promise (option) to 
give possession opened the way for the signing of the ADL 
which was the benefit plaintiff sought. The fact that the 
ADL was not signed nor that the plaintiff did not exercise 
its option was not the fault of the owners and in no way 
takes away from the fact that the granting of that option was 
the bargained for consideration. The owners fully complied 
with the terms and provisions of the contract in every 
1 7
 Pp. 24-26. 
13 
respect. 
The fact that the signing of the ADL may also have been 
of benefit to Lincoln or neighboring owners does not alter 
the fact that it was a direct benefit to the plaintiff. 
Plaintiff was the entity charged with the successful 
redevelopment of Block 57. It was it's duty to enlist a 
suitable developer and expedite matters to keep the Block 
from sinking further into economic stagnation. The ADL 
agreement obligated the developer to proceed with 
redevelopment of the Block. Had the plaintiff not had a 
direct and vital interest in having the ADL signed it would 
not have brought bring this condemnation action to acquire 
the property, it would not have defended the action brought 
before Judge Uno by other owners seeking to defeat the 
redevelopment, it would not have signed the contract with the 
owners obligating itself to deposit $275,220.00 and pay 
interest from the date of the option, nor would it have 
entered into other option agreements with the neighbors to 
buy their properties. 
Plaintiff would have been the first to seek enforcement 
of the option if the owners had decided the next day to 
withdraw their promise to convey. The plaintiff would then 
not have hesitated to argue that the option was an essential 
part of the contract that inured to plaintiff's benefit. 
14 
4. Unjust enrichment to the plaintiff would result if 
no interest were paid. It is the owners' position that the 
contract is not void, but even if the court were to rule 
otherwise plaintiff still received the benefit of the owners 
option as discussed above, and under equitable principles 
plaintiff would be unjustly enriched if it did not pay value 
therefore.18 Plaintiffs duty, responsibility and purpose is 
to bring about redevelopment of the Block and accordingly it 
was benefited by the contract. The reasonable value of this 
benefit is the interest as provided for in the contract.19 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT IS AUTHORIZED TO MAKE AN AWARD 
FOR EXPERT WITNESS FEES OR OTHER TRIAL PREPARATION 
EXPENSES PURSUANT TO § 11-19-23.9, UTAH CODE ANN., 1953 
Plaintiff argues that as used in § 11-19-23.9 Utah Code 
Ann., 1953, (hereinafter the "subject statute" or "Utah 
statute") "the word •costs' therein does, in fact, include 
only the usual and statutorily permitted taxable costs."20 
Restitution should be paid when "money was received 
under such circumstances that it would give offense 
to equity and good conscience to permit the 
possessor to retain it." Thermoid Western Co. v. 
Union Pacific Railroad Co. 365 P.2d 65, 69, 12 Utah 
2d 256 (1961) . "A person who has been unjustly 
enriched at the expense of another is required to 
make restitution to the other." Restatement of 
Restitution § 1. 
5A Corbin on Contracts, § 1124, page 15 (1964). 
Brief of Respondents, page 25. 
15 
Plaintiff has cited cases for the holding that fees paid to 
expert witnesses are not part of the general costs 
customarily taxed as court costs such as those authorized by 
Rule 54(d)(1), U.R.C.P.. The owners do not contend that the 
commonly accepted meaning of "court costs" includes fees paid 
to expert witnesses. They do assert, however, that when a 
special statute authorizes an award for expert witness fees, 
that legislative intent should be carried out, and § 11-19-
23.9 Utah Code Ann., 1953, does authorize such an award. 
The meaning of "costs" is not always limited to the 
narrow definition of "court costs" authorized by the general 
cost provisions of Rule 54(d)(1), U.R.C.P. When "costs" is 
used in an expanded context a broader definition should be 
given. This was the point made by the California case cited 
at length by the plaintiff.21 It held that the condemnation 
statute authorizing an award of costs was limited to the 
customary "court costs" because the wording of that statute 
was identical to the wording of the general statute regarding 
taxation of court costs. The court went on to clarify, 
however, that had the wording been different in "material 
particulars" then "costs" should be given its special 
meaning. The court cited with approval a New York City 
Brief of Respondents, pp. 20-21. 
16 
case22 awarding expert witness fees under a statute 
authorizing an award of "costs, fees, and expenses". The 
court noted that "(i)t would appear that the appellate 
court's construction of the special statute, which was 
different from our legislative enactments in material 
particulars, was eminently proper."23 
The applicable wording of § 11-19-23.9, Utah Code Ann., 
1953, is as follows: 
"...(T)he court may,...award in addition to his 
just compensation, costs. including a reasonable 
attorney's fee as determined by the court. The court... 
may also award a reasonable sum as compensation for the 
costs and expenses, if any, of relocating the owner.... 
An award may also be made for damages to any fixtures or 
personal property owned by the owner of such acquired 
property...if such fixtures or personal property are 
damaged as a result of such acquisition or relocation." 
(Emphasis added). 
A statute authorizing an award of "costs" when that term 
stands alone, or "costs and attorney's fees" could well 
define "costs" to be the usual "court costs" taxable under 
Rule 54(d)(1), U.R.C.P. But these terms do not convey the 
same meaning as an authorization of "costs including 
attorney's fees." "Including" connotes that "attorney's fees" 
is included within and is part of the meaning of the term 
In re Commissioners of Palisades Park. 83 Misc. 
Rep. 186, 144 N.Y.S. 782. 
The City of Los Angeles v. Vickers, 81 Cal.App. 
737, 254 Pac. 687, 688 (1927). 
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"costs," hence extending the definition of "costs" beyond the 
narrow "usual and statutorily permitted taxable costs"24 
urged by plaintiff. This is especially true where "costs" is 
used twice in the same section. In authorizing an award for 
"costs and expenses, if any, of relocating the owner", it 
makes clear that the legislature intended a broader 
definition of "costs". It simply does not make sense if you 
replace "costs" with plaintiff's definition. The legislature 
did not intend an award of "usual and statutorily permitted 
taxable costs...of relocating the owner". 
This is the reason for the owners' reliance upon Dade 
County v. Brigham, 47 So.2d 602 (Fla. 1950), attached as 
Exhibit "D" to the appendix of the Brief of Appellants.25 
The Florida statute being construed was almost identical to 
our Utah statute in that it provided that "All costs of 
proceedings shall be paid by the petitioner, including a 
reasonable attorney's fee...."2 6 Under such statutory 
2 4
 Brief of Respondents, page 25. 
2 5
 Owners also cited Union Exploration Co. v. Moffat 
Tunnel Improvement Dist. 89 P.2d 257 (Colo. 1939), 
which upheld an award to the owner by "the district 
court assessing as costs fees paid by defendant to 
it's expert witnesses. In an equity case the 
taxation of costs ordinarily rest in the sound 
discretion of the court. §6, chapter 43, 435 
C.S.A." (Brief of Appellants, page 41) 
2 6
 § 73.16 Florida Statute 1941, F.S.A. (emphasis 
added). 
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language the court concluded that: 
"When so construed the language §A11 costs of 
proceedings...' must be held, in a proper case, to 
include fees of expert witnesses for the defendants". 
(Id. at 604). 
In contrast the statutes being interrupted in the cases 
cited by the plaintiff differ materially from the Utah and 
Florida statutes so as to limit the value of their holdings. 
In those cases the courts are interpreting statutes that 
simply authorize an award of "costs" without additional 
wording to suggest that anything other than the usual "court 
costs" was intended. The Oklahoma statute simply authorizes 
that "all costs in the district court shall be taxed against 
him".27 Nevada provided that "costs may be allowed".28 
California provided that "costs are allowed of course".29 
The Utah case cited by plaintiff30 simply holds that expert 
witness fees are not taxable as court costs in a wrongful 
death action, since there is no specific statute so 
providing. 
It is submitted that in condemnations brought by the 
R.D.A. § 11-19-23.9, Utah Code Ann., 1953, authorizes an 
2 7
 69 O.S. 1971 § 1203(e)(f). 
2 8
 NRS 37.190. 
29
 § 1022, Code of Civil Procedure. 
3 0
 Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771 (Utah 1980). 
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award for expert witness fees. When interrupted in light of 
its special wording and the purpose intended of fully 
compensating the landowners the statute takes the meaning of 
"costs" out of the general definition of "court costs" so as 
to include expert witness fees necessarily incurred by the 
owners. This is the holding of the Dade County case which 
is not a minority view in the interpretation of statutes 
similar to Utah's statute. Plaintiff has cited no cases in 
which a statute using similar wording to the subject statute 
has been limited to an award of "court costs." "Costs" 
cannot be defined in isolation. It must be construed in 
light of the context in which it is used. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff has been benefited by the owners' promises in 
the contract and should pay to the owners interest in the 
amount of 11.5 percent per annum on the sum of $275,220.00 
for three years, less the rate at which the principal would 
have earn€»d funds if fully invested at the highest rate 
available for federally insured accounts during the period 
from June 7, 1987 to August 16, 1988. Further the provisions 
of § 11-19-23.9 Utah Code Ann., 1953 should be interpreted as 
authorizing the trial court to make an award to the owners 
for expert witness fees and other litigation expenses 
reasonably and necessarily incurred, and that the owners be 
20 
awarded reasonable attorney's fees incurred in this appeal. 
Dated this -^ "~ day of February, 1988, 
DART, ADAMSON, & KASTING 
Jjllli [in' i ruanC 
Jojm T. Evans, 
Attorney for Defendants/ 
Appellants 
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